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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
R. M. BIRDZELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH OIL REFINING COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 92127 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant brought this Action against the Respond-
ent, his Summons having been filed on the 5th day of February, 
1951. In August, 1936, the Respondent, Utah Oil Company, 
made a lease to Mr. R. M. Birdzell, Appellant, all of the Re-
spondent's Service Station property designated as Service Sta-
tion No. 511 in Wendover, Utah, this lease being in reality 
a sub-lease of said property inasmuch as the prop~rty in question 
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is owned by the Western Pacific Railroad Company. For the 
furtherance of their own company, the Respondents seek out 
and make leases for the use of certain property belonging to 
the Western Pacific Railroad Company for the purpose of 
establishing outlets for their products on that ~and. Due to 
the business organization of said Respondent, it has become 
customary for that company to further provide leases to indi-
viduals, which leases grant said individuals the right to operate 
Service Stations for the distribution of Respondent's products. 
In August, 1936, the Respondent leased to Mr. Birdzell, 
the Appellant, the property and holdings in Wen dover, Utah 
designated as Station No. 511, upon a yearly basis, such leases 
being perpetuated by an option of renewal to the Appellant 
written into each lease. This arrangement continued with 
each yearly lease being renewed until the end of 1947. At 
this time, Respondent made known to the Appellant that the 
original lease which they had from the Railroad Company 
had expired in that year. That lease was to expire at the end 
of 1947. Shortly prior to the end of 1947, Appellant became 
anxious as to his further business prospects and made several 
requests to the Respondent for a lease to be consummated. 
After numerous discussions, personal and by telephone, it was 
decided by the Appellant and the respondent that should the 
Respondent Oil Company be successful in obtaining a renewal 
of their lease with the 'Railroad Company, that they would 
make a sub-lea~e of the unexpired term to Appellant. After 
such oral agreement had been arrived at, a letter was written 
by Mr. A. G. Olofson, representing Utah Oil Company to Mr. 
R. M. Birdzell, Appellant, setting forth the terms of that 
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agreement. This letter clearly sets forth the terms of the agree-
ment which had been arrived at orally. It definitely established 
the property interest in question by indicating that the lease 
would be in the same terms as previous leases held between 
Respondent and Appellant. The letter was signed by A. G. 
Olofson, an authorized agent of the Respondent Oil Company, 
the party sought to be charged in this action. This letter appears 
in the trial brief as Appendix "B" (enclosure) of Appellant's 
papers. 
After receipt of said letter, Appellant continued in posses-
sion of said premises until the date of January 10, 1949, at 
which time Respondent terminated Appellant's lease. 
This action is sought by Appellant to recover damages 
suffered by Appellant as a result of Respondent's breach of 
the above mentioned agreement to make a lease with Appellant 
for the remainder of the ten (10) year period of Respondent's 
lease with the Railroad Company. 
The case was brought to trial before a trial judge as was 
stated above in February, 1951. After the filing of the pre-
liminary papers which appear in the trial brief submitted 
by the Clerk's office, the motion for a Summary Judgment was 
made by the Respondent on the grounds that the oral agreement 
between the parties above mentioned to make a lease was 
within Section 33-5-3· of Utah Code, Annotated and that such 
letter, as is marked Appendix "B" in the trial brief was not 
sufficient memorandum to make such oral agreement comply 
with the Statutes of Frauds. Upon consideration of Respond-
ent's motion, the Court granted a Summary Judgment for the 
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Respondent and against the Appellant for the cause above 
stated. It is this point of law upon which Appellant relies in 
this appeal. 
POINTS INVOLVED 
Did the Court rule correctly that the letter marked Ap-
pendix "B" in the trial brief was insufficient to constitute a 
memorandum which would take an oral agreement to make a 
lease out of the Statute of Frauds. We have concluded that. 
the trial court erred in this ruling because: 
ARGUMENTS 
In accordance with our position in this matter, we first 
draw the Court's attention to Section 33-5-3 of the Utah Code 
Annotated which reads as follows: 
"Every contract with a lease for a longer period than 
one year or for the sale of any lands or any interest in 
lands shall be void unless the contract, or some note 
or memorandum is in writing subscribed by the party 
to whom the. lease or sale is to be made, or by his law-
ful agent thereunto authorized in writing." 
In explanation of the Statute indicating a note or memo-
randum will be sufficient if signed by the party to be charged, 
several cases may be cited: 
Dennison v. Hildt, 70 P. 2d 56, speaking generally says: 
6 
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"The Statute of Frauds is not a law relating to the 
formality of the execution of contracts, but merely 
requiring a memorandum as evidence of the contract." 
In reliance on this case, we feel that certainly there is 
an indication of the oral agreement set forth in the letter in 
question. Further in this clarification we quote from Holsz v. 
Stephen, 200 NE 601: 
"A memorandum in writing is sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds that certain con-
tracts shall be evidenced by writing, if it contains the 
names of the parties, the terms and conditions of the 
contract and a description of the property sufficient 
to render it capacable of identification." 
Certainly here there would be no que~tion but that this 
letter was signed by the party to be charged or the lawful agent 
thereto, but it is further urged that the letter written by Re-
spondent to Appellant sufficiently set forth the terms of the 
oral agreement, it being seen that all the conditions for affect-
ing the lease were set down in said letter. The letter also meets 
the requirements of a description of the property or property 
interest, the property interest in this case being the le~se for 
a term of ten years. The letter marked Appendix "B" would 
leave no doubt but that this was the lease referred to in said 
letter. If it be argued that the lease itself was not the property 
interest to be described, but that in reality it was the real 
property itself, then certainly the description of the property, 
being that of "our station No. 511 at Wendover, Utah" would 
satisfy as description of the property in question. 
Reading Axe v. Botts, 37 A 2d ~72: 
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·'The prov~sion of the Statute of Frauds that con-
tracts to create an interest in real estate shall be un-
enforceable unless they be in writing and signed by 
the parties so making or creating the same, or their 
agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, is 
satisfied if the parties to be charged or the properly 
authorized agents have executed a writing embodying 
the terms of the agreement." 
American Law Reports Annotated further bears out this 
view in Volume 80, P 1475: 
"It is settled not only by the, tacit assumption of 
numerous cases discussed throughout this annotation, 
but also by the cases which have expressly passed upon 
the question, that the contract or the memorandum 
thereof, required by the Statute to be in writing, need 
not be a formal writing in the form of a regular con-
tract, and that the agreement to employ or to pay 
commissions, or the authorization to sell or purchase, 
may be embodied in or deduced from correspondence, 
letters, or telegrams exchanged between parties." 
A Utah case which falls directly on point with the view 
stated by the A. L. R. is Fritsch v. Hess, 49 Ut. 75: 
"From an examination of the evidence in the case, 
we find that the dealings between the plaintiff and the 
defendant with reference to the employment of the 
defendant as agent and with reference to the particular 
sale claimed to have been made by the plaintiff for the 
defendant were by correspondence, either by letters 
transmitted by mail, or by messages transmitted by 
telegraph. Throughout the dealings the plaintiff was 
at Salt Lake City, in the State of Utah, and the defend-
ant was in the State of California. We find that, so far 
as the contract of employment between the plaintiff 
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and defendant is concerned, these letters and telegrams 
are sufficient to constitute 'some note or memorandum 
thereof in writing subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith.' It is well settled that no particular form 
of words is necessary to comply with this statute, and 
that almost any kind of writing ·will be sufficient if 
it be signed by the party sought to be charged and 
contains the essential terms of a contnict." 
In conclusion, may it be stated that the only point for 
consideration here is whether or not the letter in question, 
marked Appendix "B" in the trial brief is a sufficient memo-
randum to comply with the Statute of Frauds. This follows 
from the decree of the trial court. Said court received the 
motion for a Summary Judgment on the issue of said letter's 
insufficiency and rendered its judgment in compliance with 
that motion. We have attempted here to cite authority which 
would substantiate our contention that this letter was in fact 
a sufficient memorandum and such authority would indicate 
that the trial court erred in rendering its Summary Judgment 
on the basis of its insufficiency as a memorandum to comply 
with the Statute of Frauds. 
SHIELDS & SHIELDS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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